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Abstract 
We analyse the incentive effects of the Performance-Vesting Equity (PVE) component of executive pay 
that is characterised by zero exercise price and performance-contingent vesting. We demonstrate how 
PVE with upward-sloping convex/concave vesting curves can be a more efficient risk-sharing and 
incentive alignment device than strictly convex stock options.  
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1. Introduction 
Recent research suggests that using `plain vanilla’ options for the purpose of providing risk-averse 
CEOs with target levels of utility and effort incentives can be costly and less efficient than using 
restricted stock with zero exercise price (Dittmann and Maug (2007), hereafter DM, and Dittmann, Yu, 
and Zhang (2017), hereafter DYZ), i.e., the strictly convex options are too risky to be an effective risk-
sharing mechanism. 
While recent studies document a decline in the use of executive stock options in the USA, Bettis 
et al. (2018) show empirically that pay convexity has not declined over time. Rather, PVE, an 
increasingly popular element of CEO pay, contributes significantly to measures of pay convexity in 
recent years. PVE typically vests after three years, based on a blend of stock-price (e.g. Total 
Shareholder Return) and accounting (e.g. EPS) metrics. The growing use of PVE has also been reported 
in the UK (Buck et al. 2003; Carter et al. 2009; Skovoroda and Bruce 2017). Can PVE and its associated 
pay convexity be cost-efficient? 
We demonstrate that under the standard assumptions of risk-neutral firms and risk averse CEOs, 
PVE can be efficient. Importantly, cost-efficient PVE does not yield strictly convex payouts – PVE 
payouts are convex for medium outcomes and concave for good (high) outcomes. This result is 
consistent with both the shape of vesting rules observed in practice (Carter et al. 2009) and with the 
shape of the optimal incentive contract (DYZ).  
 
2. Model  
We analyse PVE by extending models in DM, where firm risk is exogenous, and in DYZ, where 
it is endogenous, and show that PVE can be cost-efficient under either assumption. While DM and DYZ 
investigate incentive contracts of stocks and options, they do not analyse the effects of performance-
contingent vesting. 
 
2.1 Exogenous firm risk 
The risk-averse CEO has CRRA utility 𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑉) − 𝐶(𝑎) = 𝑉1−𝛾 (1 − 𝛾)⁄ − 𝐶(𝑎), where 𝑉 
is the CEO’s wealth, 𝛾 ≠ 1 is the parameter of relative risk aversion, 𝑎 is the CEO’s effort, and 𝐶(𝑎) 
is the convex cost of effort. The CEO has initial (not firm-related) wealth 𝑊0, reservation utility 𝐸(𝑈) =
𝑈0, and is paid with a mix of risk-free wages 𝑊 and performance stock 𝑁. We omit stock options, since 
options are shown to be inefficient in DM1.  
While both DM and DYZ assume that the size of the stock-based pay element 𝑁 does not 
depend on firm performance, PVE is characterized by partial vesting 𝑁(𝑠),  𝑁0 ≤ 𝑁(𝑠) ≤ 𝑁0 + 𝑁1, 
based on the firm’s stock price 𝑠 at maturity. The novelty of our study is in its focus on efficient vesting 
rules 𝑁(𝑠). For calibration purposes, we assume performance-contingent vesting in the form: 
(1)                                                                𝑁(𝑠) = 𝑁0 +
𝑠ℎ𝑁1
𝑠ℎ+𝐴ℎ
,  
where 𝑁0 ≥ 0 is the number of stocks that vest across all levels of performance (i.e. non-PVE); 𝑁1 ≥
0 is the size of the PVE element where vesting is subject to performance conditions; 𝐴 > 0 is the level 
of performance that pays 50 percent of PVE. Importantly, the hill factor ℎ affects the shape of the 
vesting curve – for values 0 < ℎ ≤ 1 vesting rule (1) is strictly concave, while for values ℎ > 1 it is 
convex for relatively lower values of 𝑠 and concave for larger values of 𝑠.  
The stock price at maturity 𝑇 is log-normally distributed ln(𝑠) ~ 𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎2𝑇) with density 
𝑓(𝑠) = 𝑓(𝑠, 𝜇, 𝜎2𝑇). Mean log-price 𝜇 = 𝜇(𝑎) is increasing and concave with CEO effort. Consistent 
with DM, the level of firm-specific risk 𝜎 is exogenous in this section, i.e. the CEO does not affect 𝜎.  
The CEO maximization problem, given incentive contract (𝑊, 𝑁0, 𝑁1, 𝐴, ℎ), is:  
                                                          max
𝑎,𝜎
{𝐸 (𝑈(𝑊0 + 𝑊 + 𝑠𝑁(𝑠))) − 𝐶(𝑎)},  
s.t: 𝜎 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡.  
The first order condition and the incentive compatibility constraint is 
𝑑
𝑑𝜇
𝐸[𝑈(𝑊0 + 𝑊 + 𝑠𝑁(𝑠))] =
𝐶′
𝜇′
. 
Assuming the cost-minimizing risk-neutral firm wishes to implement 𝑎, the firm’s problem is:  
(2)                                               min
𝑊,𝑁0,𝑁1,𝐴,ℎ
{𝐸(𝑊 + 𝑠𝑁(𝑠))},  
s.t: 𝐸[𝑈(𝑊0 + 𝑊 + 𝑠𝑁(𝑠))] = 𝑈0, 
                                                          
1 Dittmann, Maug and Spalt (2013) model stock options where the strike price is indexed to a benchmark and 
argue that indexing options would further increase compensation costs. 
𝑑𝐸[𝑈]
𝑑𝜇
=
𝐶′(𝑎)
𝜇′(𝑎)
.  
To illustrate the effect of PVE on the strengths of effort incentives 
𝑑𝐸[𝑈]
𝑑𝜇
, we write  
(3)                      
𝑑𝐸[𝑈]
𝑑𝜇
=
𝑑
𝑑𝜇
[∫  𝑈(𝑊0 + 𝑊 + 𝑠𝑁(𝑠)) 𝑓(𝑠, 𝜇, 𝜎
2𝑇) 𝑑𝑠
∞
0
]
= ∫ 𝑈(𝑊0 + 𝑊 + 𝑠𝑁(𝑠)) 𝑓𝜇
′(𝑠, 𝜇, 𝜎2𝑇) 𝑑𝑠
∞
0
= ∫
𝑑 𝑈
𝑑 𝑙𝑛(𝑠)
 𝑓(𝑠, 𝜇, 𝜎2𝑇) 𝑑𝑠 = ∫  𝑠 (𝑁(𝑠) +
𝑑𝑁(𝑠)
𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝑠)
) 𝑈′ 𝑓(𝑠, 𝜇, 𝜎2𝑇) 𝑑𝑠
∞
0
∞
0
 
We integrate by parts in (3) using property 𝑓𝜇
′ = −(𝑠𝑓)𝑠
′ . Equations (1) and (3) show that PVE 
structures (𝑁1 > 0) add a positive term 
𝑑𝑁(𝑠)
𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝑠)
> 0 to the strengths of effort incentives. As we further 
show in Section 3, PVE-based incentives are powerful, i.e. cost-efficient per unit of shareholder funds: 
cost-efficient contracts (2) include performance stocks (𝑁1 > 0), do not include restricted stocks (𝑁0 =
0), and have positively-sloping vesting curves with convex/concave shapes ℎ > 1. 
 
2.2 Endogenous firm risk 
While Program (2) assumes that firm risk is exogenous, DYZ study the case of endogenous risk 
where CEOs can also choose firm risk in addition to effort. An important feature of PVE is its ability 
to provide incentives to undertake risky projects with higher returns. To capture this feature, we allow 
CEO effort 𝑎 to yield a menu of potential projects (𝜇, 𝜎) such that 𝜇 ≤ 𝜑(𝜎, 𝑎), where 𝜑 is increasing 
and concave in both arguments. This means, for any level of effort, more valuable projects are also 
riskier and the CEO faces a trade-off between risk 𝜎 and potential return 𝜇. This is also consistent with 
scenarios where CEOs have opportunities to reduce firm-specific risk by pursuing unrelated 
diversification and costly hedging strategies. These activities, if they reduce firm value, are inefficient 
from the shareholders’ point of view.  
The CEO maximization problem now is:  
max
𝑎,𝜎
{𝐸 [𝑈 (𝑊0 + 𝑊 + 𝑠𝑁(𝑠)) ] − 𝐶(𝑎)} 
                                                        𝑠. 𝑡: 𝜇 ≤ 𝜑(𝜎, 𝑎), 
and the first-order condition is  
𝑑𝐸[𝑈]
𝑑𝜇
= 𝐶′ 𝜇′⁄ , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 −
(
𝑑𝐸[𝑈]
𝑑𝜎
)
(
𝑑𝐸[𝑈]
𝑑𝜇
)
= 𝜑𝜎
′ (𝜎, 𝑎). While 
𝑑𝐸[𝑈]
𝑑𝜇
 measures the 
strengths of effort incentives, ratio − (
𝑑𝐸[𝑈]
𝑑𝜎
) / (
𝑑𝐸[𝑈]
𝑑𝜇
) defines CEOs’ risk-taking incentives. If the firm 
wishes to implement (𝑎, 𝜎), the cost-minimisation problem now is:  
(4)                                                min
𝑊,𝑁0,𝑁1,𝐴,ℎ
{𝐸 (𝑊 + 𝑠𝑁(𝑠))},  
s.t: 𝐸[𝑈 (𝑊0 + 𝑊 + 𝑠𝑁(𝑠))] = 𝑈0,  
 
𝑑𝐸[𝑈]
𝑑𝜇
= 𝐶′ 𝜇′⁄ , 
− (
𝑑𝐸[𝑈]
𝑑𝜎
) / (
𝑑𝐸[𝑈]
𝑑𝜇
) =  𝜑𝜎
′ (𝜎, 𝑎).  
 
3. Empirical calibrations 
In Table 1 (Panel A), we estimate the values of 𝑈0, 𝑑𝐸[𝑈]/𝑑𝜇, and  − (
𝑑𝐸[𝑈]
𝑑𝜎
) / (
𝑑𝐸[𝑈]
𝑑𝜇
) = 𝜑𝜎
′  
for a representative CEO with a benchmark (not cost-efficient) contract of non-performance-contingent 
restricted stocks with unconditional vesting. Relevant parameters are at the median of the sample in 
DM. The benchmark contract costs $16.483 million to the firm over three years. Results are shown for 
values 2, 3, and 4 of risk-aversion parameter 𝛾.  
Panel A shows that, while for 𝛾 = 2 the benchmark non-PVE contract ensures CEO’s (local) 
risk-neutrality (𝜑𝜎
′ = 0.002 ≈ 0), for higher values of risk-aversion 3 and 4 it induces conservative 
selection of projects (𝜑𝜎
′ = 0.237 and 𝜑𝜎
′ = 0.444) and might deter the CEO from risky projects with 
higher expected returns. 
Optimal contracts when risk incentives are relevant: Panel B, Table 1, shows our main result: 
PVE with convex/concave shapes ℎ > 1 can efficiently induce higher levels of risk-taking (i.e. lower 
levels of 𝜑𝜎
′ ) than contracts with flat unconditional vesting while providing the CEO with the same 
utility and the same effort incentives as the benchmark contract. In particular, convex/concave PVE can 
efficiently induce risk-neutral selection of projects (𝜑𝜎
′ = 0). We show this by solving Program (4) 
while taking the benchmark values of utility 𝑈0 and effort incentives 𝑑𝐸[𝑈]/𝑑𝜇 as relevant constraints 
and assuming a range of risk incentives 𝜑𝜎
′  that the firm might choose to target that includes the 
benchmark levels (𝜑𝜎
′ = 0.002 for 𝛾 = 2, 𝜑𝜎
′ = 0.237 for 𝛾 = 3, and 𝜑𝜎
′ = 0.444 for 𝛾 = 4, marked 
in bold). While inducing higher levels of risk-taking increases the compensation costs, this may be 
efficient for the firm.  
Optimal contracts when risk incentives are irrelevant: While convex/concave PVE contracts  
induce higher levels of risk-taking, they are also more cost-efficient than flat vesting contracts. Higher 
efficiency savings are possible if CEOs do not influence firm risk (the assumption behind Program (3)). 
In Panel C, Table 1, we take the values of 𝑈0 and 𝑑𝐸[𝑈]/𝑑𝜇 from the benchmark contract as constraints 
to solve Program (2). For 𝛾 = 4, the cost-efficient contract costs $15.885 million and saves about 
$598,000 over three years while providing the CEO with the same utility and the same effort incentives 
as the benchmark contract.  
 
4. Conclusions  
Overall, under the standard assumptions of risk-neutral firms and risk averse CEOs, upward-
sloped convex/concave vesting curves are efficient under a wide range of parameters. Simply put, PVE 
is less risky than options and can be used more efficiently in incentive contracts.  
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Table 1. Cost-efficient PVE. 
This Table describes the risk incentives, cost, and the average expected vesting ratio of the benchmark incentive 
contract of restricted stocks and that of the optimal incentive contracts of performance stocks for a representative 
CEO where parameters are close to the median of the sample in Dittmann and Maug (2007), (see Panel A, Table 
I therein). The parameters are: initial non-firm wealth 𝑊0 = $6.86 million, three-year wage 𝑊 = $3.783 million, 
standard deviation of log returns 𝜎 = 0.335 and maturity 𝑇 = 3 years. The value of restricted stocks in the 
benchmark contract at maturity is $12.7 million. Without loss of generality, the expected stock price at maturity 
is $10, which implies mean log-price 𝜇 = 2.13 and 𝑁0 = 1.27 million for the quantity of restricted stocks in the 
benchmark contract. Results are shown for values 2, 3, and 4 of the risk-aversion 𝛾. 
Risk-
aversi
on 
Risk incentives 
induced; lower 
values indicate 
CEO is less likely 
to pursue risk-
reduction strategies 
that also reduce 
firm value.  
Parameters of contracts:  
Three-year wage  𝑊; 𝑁0 - quantity of 
restricted stocks with vesting not 
conditional on performance; 𝑁1 - 
quantity of performance-contingent 
stocks; 𝐴 - median vesting location 
parameter; ℎ - hill coefficient. 
Risk-neutral Cost to the firm; 
Expected percentage of vested 
stocks; 
𝛾  𝜑𝜎
′   𝑊 
($ m) 
𝑁0 
(m) 
𝑁1 
(m) 
𝐴 
($) 
ℎ Cost 
($ m) 
Expected % of 
vested stocks 
 Panel A: Benchmark incentive contract of restricted stocks (not cost-efficient) 
2 0.002 3.783 1.27 0 0 0 16.483 100 
3 0.237 3.783 1.27 0 0 0 16.483 100 
4 0.444 3.783 1.27 0 0 0 16.483 100 
Panel B: Cost-efficient PVE that solves Program (4) for alternative risk incentives 𝜑𝜎
′  while providing the CEO 
with the same utility 𝑈0 and effort incentives 𝑑𝐸[𝑈]/𝑑𝜇 as the benchmark contract in Panel A. 
2 0.002 7.917 0 0.990 5.996 6.787 16.403 70.5 
 0 7.932 0 0.990 6.017 6.774 16.405 70.3 
3 0.237 7.748 0 0.952 5.530 10.4 16.270 75.8 
 0.1 8.508 0 0.986 6.752 10.21 16.617 64.4 
 0  8.939 0 1.049 7.61 11.08 16.997 56.9 
4 0.444 7.517 0 0.927 5.049 15.178 16.094 80.8 
 0.2 8.639 0 1.045 6.928 16.442 17.188 63.2 
 0 9.254 0 1.498 8.379 28.421 20.081 50.6 
Panel C: Cost-efficient PVE that solves Program (2) while providing the CEO with the same utility 𝑈0 and 
effort incentives 𝑑𝐸[𝑈]/𝑑𝜇 as the benchmark contract in Panel A. Program (3) assumes that firm risk is 
exogenous, CEO does not set firm risk, and risk incentives 𝜑𝜎
′  are irrelevant. 
2 0.157 6.368 0 1.033 4.246 17.88 16.271 87.9 
3 0.383 6.386 0 1.002 3.994 26.50 16.087 90.0 
4 0.577 6.358 0 0.976 3.751 37.65 15.885 91.8 
 
 
    
